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This paper reviews the development and assesses the future of Peer-to-Peer 
(P2P) lending in China.  Chinese P2P lending has expanded by a factor of 60 
over the four years from 2013 and 2017. Consequently, it is now much greater, 
both in absolute terms and relative to the size of the economy, than in any 
other country. The industry though has been plagued by problematic often 
fraudulent business models in what was, until 2015, effectively a regulatory 
vacuum. A strict new regulatory regime is currently being introduced. However, 
by its introduction, especially the requirements on capital requirements and 
registration, are substantially reducing the volume of P2P lending. We consider 
the future of P2P lending concluding it’s facing substantial uncertainties.  
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1. Introduction 
China has by far the most spectacular growth in P2P of any country worldwide (Table 1 and 
Table 2). This tremendous growth has however taken place within what was effectively a 
regulatory vacuum. The recent establishment of a regulatory regime for P2P lending in 
China, following a wave of scandals in the sector, is now resulting in a sharp contraction in 
Chinese P2P lending.  
 
Table 1: The volume of P2P SME lending in the leading nine countries around the world. 
 
Countries 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
China 1,440 8,040 39,630 57,780 97,430
US 342 968 2,580 1,330 1,450
UK 302 1,234 1,347 1,670 2,627
Japan  79 107 324 165 189
France                -   11 31 78 99
Germany                -   8 54 26 81
Australia                -                  -   8 7 23
N Zealand                -                  -                  -   7.5 14.2
P2P SME Lending in million $
 
 
Source: author’s calculations using data from the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance. 
Numbers converted to $ by average currency rates for the year. 











2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
China 5,520 23,820 97,580 201,310 327,800 207,590
US 3,176 8,742 21,282 23,420 17,340 27,420
UK 751 2,135 3,667 4,810 6,005 6,359
Japan 79 108 326 171 236 873
Germany 48 116 205 227 448 813
France 57 117 181 277 431 494
Australia 2 16 70 165 365 321
New Zealand                -   14 245 178 242 222
Total P2P lending Million $
 
 
Source: author’s calculations using data from the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance. 
Numbers converted into $ dollars at average exchange rate. 
Latest available figures are 2018 
 
 
This article reviews the rise of peer-to-peer (P2P) in China and the prospects for its future 
following the recent regulatory reform.1 It views these developments from the broader 
perspective of financial regulation and the light of similar challenges of regulation of P2P 
lending in the other leading jurisdictions for P2P lending, such as the US and the UK. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the growth of P2P lending in 
China.  Section 3 documents the emerging problems with P2P business models in China and 
the resulting new regulatory regime that aims to prevent further problems. Section 4 
compares this new regulatory regime with that established in the US and the UK, arguing 
that while representing a major step in the right direction the Chinese authority hasn’t gone 
                                                 
1 Such platforms are referred to by a variety of terms including ‘P2P lending’, ‘marketplace lending’ and ‘loan-
based crowdfunding’. They can be distinguished from other technology-based non-bank ‘balance sheet 
lenders’, who instead hold loans on their own balance sheets funded more conventionally using a mixture of 
debt and equity. The term ‘marketplace lending’ is also sometimes used, especially in the US, to refer 
collectively to both alternative lending platforms and non-bank balance sheet lenders. Here P2P lending refers 
to the technology-based platforms that allow investors to participate as investors in loan assets, with a direct 
claim on payment of interest and repayments of principal. The platform itself has no claim on these payments, 
but instead earns fees for related services including the assessment of credit risk, the matching of investors 






far enough in investor protection. Section 5 assesses the uncertain future prospects for 
Chinese P2P lending. Section 6 is a summary conclusion.   
2. The growth of P2P lending in China 
This section describes the rapid growth of P2P lending in China, explores the reasons for its 
spectacular rise and the weakness of the business models adopted in Chinese P2P lending. 
China’s first online lending platform, PPDAI group launched in 2007. The industry has grown 
spectacularly over the subsequent decade, with the number of platforms reaching  2,595 in 
2015 (Wangdai Zhijia); 2 and the volume of lending is the biggest in the world ((33) Table 1). 
Even as late as June 2018, the industry reportedly channelled loans from 4.1 million 
investors to 4.3 million borrowers (33). 
 
 
Table 3 provides some more detailed statistics on Chinese P2P lending. 
Table 3 The development of Chinese P2P lending 
Key indicators  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Number of 
providers  









































































Source: Wangdai Zhijia, 2014, 2015, 2016 
This rapid growth of the Chinese P2P sector is commonly attributed to two intertwined 
factors:  
 China’s inefficient financial system 
                                                 
2 There are no definitive statistics on the number of platforms. The number given here is from the same source 
as Table 2. 
5 
 The Chinese authorities’ hands-off approach to its regulation  
We discuss each of these in turn. 
China’s inefficient financial system 
Despite the transformation of the real economy, the Chinese financial system can still be 
characterised as one of ‘financial repression’ i.e. with laws and policies instituted in 
developing economies to control financial systems by preventing them from functioning at 
their full capacity   (26). In a seriously repressed financial system, the interest rate is kept 
artificially low by the state so that cheap loans become available to borrowers, a de facto 
tax on savers. The policy of financial repression has been implemented by the Chinese 
government since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.  Banks 
had to comply with a floor for lending rates and a ceiling for deposits imposed by the 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) (the floor has been removed since 2013 but the ceiling 
remains)3.  The deposit rate has been kept low, to the extent real interest rate of being 
negative in some periods (18).  The emergence of P2P sector met Chinese savers’ demand 
for a better investment alternative and therefore attracted millions of retail investors in 
only a few years. It is reported that more than 60 percent of the China’ P2P platforms 
offered an annual yield in the range between 12 and 18 percent or between 18 and 24 
percent,  which is considerably higher than the 3.3 percent paid by commercial banks (28).   
 
China’s financial system is dominated by state-owned banks which has a preference for 
lending to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or large private companies and leaves a large 
number of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) under-served.4 Only 25 percent of 
Chinese firms report having a loan or line of credit, among small firms the figure was 14 
percent (Kuntchev  et al., 2012). In the Enterprise Survey, Chinese firms report access to 
finance as their biggest business environment obstacle. Among small firms, just 4 percent 
                                                 
3 In August 2019, the People’s Bank of China (The PBOC) made a further step to liberalise interest rate by 
promoting Loan Prime Rate (LPR). The PBOC has ordered that between March and August this year, banks 
must rework all floating-rate loan contracts to refer to the one- and five-year LPRs instead of the previous 
benchmark loan rates. However, we consider this reform has little relevance to this paper that focused on the 
period of 2011-2019.   
4 Small enterprises are defined as firms with 5–19 employees; Medium, defined as firms with 20–99 
employees; and Large, defined as firms with 100 or more employees. 
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use banks to finance investments, and bank financing accounts for less than 1 percent of 
funding for investments (Kuntchev  et al., 2012). 
 
Apart from political bias, SMEs financing is a worldwide challenge. Lack of credit information 
and under-collateralisation are considered to be major factors accounting for the financial 
constraints faced by SMEs. Traditional banks have been proved to be ill-equipped to tackle 
this challenge. P2P lending platforms seemed to offer a better solution by utilizing 
automated processes to reduce costs and credit risk models that use non-traditional data. 
Quick decision making and no collateral requirement rendered P2P sector an important 
financial source to SMEs in China, with 20 to 40 percent of all loans flowing into SMEs, a 
sharp contrast with the U.S. (ACCA 2015, Table 1 and Table 2 above).  
The Chinese authorities’ hands-off approach to its regulation 
Chinese authority’s hands-off approach to regulation has been a further driver for the rapid 
expansion of P2P sector. Prior to July 2015, the P2P sector was completely left unregulated. 
This seemed to be odd at first given China’s financial sector has always been tightly 
controlled by the government. Chinese government’s laissez faire attitude appears to have 
been based on two considerations. The first one was to find an alternative financing source 
for SMEs. SMEs now play a significant role in China’s economy: they contribute 70 per cent 
of employment, 60 per cent of GDP, 50 per cent of tax revenue, and holding 65 per cent of 
patents (Sheng, Ng and Edelmann 2013). 
 
Recognizing their economic significance, over the past two decades, the Chinese 
government has made various attempts to ease the financial stress faced by SMEs, 
especially after the 2008 financial crisis which led to a significant decline in China exports. 
However, none of these measures seemed to work effectively. As a result, the majority of 
Chinese SMEs had to heavily rely on informal lending (minjian jiedai) (interpersonal lending 
based on social network) for external financing (Allen et al., 2005).  Things got worse when 
the market for informal lending was hit by a crisis originating from Wenzhou in April 2011 
and peaked in September of the same year. Although the first P2P platform appeared in 
China as early as in 2007, it was not till 2012, i.e. after the Wenzhou financial crisis, that the 
industry really started to surge (as shown in tables 1 and 2). If the government’s inaction 
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during 2007-2011 was largely due to the negligible size of the industry, its continual non-
interference after 2012 is most easily understood as a purposive strategy that trying to 
develop the P2P sector into an alternative financing source for SMEs.  
 
The second reason behind the initial laisse faire approach was the Chinese authority’s 
failure to understand the risk emerging from P2P lending. Although the China’s P2P sector 
has become the largest market in the world, it remains a minuscule slice of overall 
borrowing: it only accounted for 0.3 percent of total banking assets in 2018 (Moody’s 
Investor Service, 2018). The relative small size of P2P sector led the Chinese authority to 
believe that there was no serious concern about substantial risk, in the worst case, it could 
simply close the whole industry down.5 However, this assessment was based on its 
understanding of traditional financial service which later proved to be a considerable 
underestimation of the scale of risk relating to Fintech-enabled financial services.  
 
In the absence of regulation, the majority of Chinese P2P platforms deviated from the 
original information intermediary business model and adopted the ‘guarantee’ model in 
order to attract investors.6 Under the guarantee model, a P2P platform not only matches 
lenders and borrowers but also provides guarantees for the lender’s principal and interests 
usually by themselves, or by cooperating with an associated guarantee company (P2P 
Research Group 2016). If a loan default occurs, the platform or the guarantee company 
compensates lenders and the lenders transfer the loan claims to the platform or the 
guarantee company for the follow-up debt collection. In addition, a platform, not the 
lender, often becomes the one that originated loans to borrowers. As a result, there is no 
direct contractual relationship between the lenders and borrowers, instead, they transact 
with the platform separately (P2P Research Group 2016).  
                                                 
5 This is consistent with the ‘trial and error’ reform strategy since 1978, examples including the establishment 
of special economic zones and stock market. Deng Xiaoping made the following famous statement on stock 
markets during his Southern Tour “ … some people insist stock is the product of capitalism. We conducted some 
experiments on stocks in Shanghai and Shenzhen, and the result has proven a success. Therefore, certain 
aspects of capitalism can be adopted by socialism. We should not be worried about making mistakes. We can 
close it [the stock exchange] and re-open it later. Nothing is 100% perfect.” Caixin, 2013. 
6 There are four business models in China’s P2P sector, apart from the guarantee module, also include the 
original information intermediary model, for example, Paipaidai; the asset securitization model, examples like 
Lufax; and the debt assignment module, like CreditEase or Yixin.  
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By adopting the guarantee model, most China’s P2P platforms were actually playing a 
similar role to that of the traditional bank, but subjected to no regulation. Chinese P2P 
platforms usually set up and registered themselves as consultancy firms and therefore their 
average size has been small. As of the middle of 2014, the averaged registered capital of the 
platforms was about RMB23.7mn ($3.8mn) and most platforms had registered capital 
between RMB5mn ($0.8mn) to RMB20mn ($3.2mn) (Shen 2015). Only 54 platforms had 
registered capital of above RMB50mn ($8.1mn) (Lufax 2015). It is hard to conceive how 
these platforms could fulfil their promises to investors with this thin capital base. They have 
either to rely on their shareholders for financial assistance, or to pay the earlier investors 
with funds from more recent investors, that is, running a Ponzi scheme. Many platforms, as 
revealed later, were indeed scams from the outset.  
 
 
3. The belated regulation of Chinese P2P lending  
This section describes the emergence of problems in Chinese P2P lending, the subsequent 
and ongoing efforts at regulation and the consequences for the industry. 
Rising levels of platform failure 
Problems with the business models of Chinese P2P lending first came to prominence in 2015 
when around 896 P2P platforms got into trouble (The 2016 Blue Book of Internet Finance), 
of which more than half was due to fraud.  In particular, the downfall of Ezubao at the end 
of this year (2015)  put the troubled industry in the spotlight.  
 
Ezubao used to be one of the highest-profile platforms, by 8 December 2015, its trading 
volume totalled at RMB 74.568 billion, involving some 909,500 investors (Caijing2018). It 
was found that 95 percent of projects financed through Ezubao were fake, fabricated by the 
platform. Ezubao scandal soon became frontpage news on all of China’s tech sites and tens 
of thousands of angry investors went on street to protest.  Some of them even travelled to 
Beijing to protest outside the central government offices (Caijing2018). The scale of 
platform failures and their economic and social consequences were far greater than the 
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government had anticipated. As described in the next sub-section, it responded with the 
introduction of a rigid, comprehensive regulatory regime. 
 
The number of platforms that ceased trading further increased in the following three years 
206-2018 (Table 4). 2018, as the new regulations came into effect, saw a major increase in 
the number of affected investors and volume of loans on failed platforms. In total, by mid-
2019, more than 2 million investors with loan investments totalling some RMB117.21bn 








Table 4: P2P platforms failures 
 
Key indicators  Numbers of platforms that 





Outstanding P2P loans 
involved (RMBbn) 
2014  395 63 6.84 ($1.1bn) 
2015 1,686 272 16.79 ($2.7bn) 
2016 3,407 454 26.59 ($4.2bn) 
2017 4,129 576 33.24 ($5.2bn) 
2018 5,417 2,154 176.65 ($26.8bn) 
2019 5,433 2,162 177.21 ($26.9bn) 
Source: Wangdai Zhijia 
Regulatory Reform 
With the increasingly visible problems with P2P business models, the Chinese government 
quickly abandoned its laissez faire approach and established a detailed, comprehensive 
regulatory framework, beginning in July 2015. It consists of four key documents (referred to 
‘1+3’ framework ):  
1. The 2016 Interim Measures on Online Lending (2016 Interim Measures); 
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2. The 2015 Guideline on the Administration of Recordation and Registration of Online 
Lending Information Intermediary Institutions (2016 Guideline on Online Lending 
Registration);  
3. The 2015 Guideline on Custodian Business for Online Lending Funds (2015 Guideline 
on Custodian Business); and  
4. The 2017 Guideline on Information Disclosure by Online Lending Information 
Intermediary Institutions (2017 Guideline on Information Disclosure).  
 
Of these, the 2016 Interim Measures is the corner stone of the regulatory regime. It 
contains a total of 47 articles that cover all important aspects of the online lending industry. 
Contravention of the 2016 Interim Measures can lead to administrative or even criminal 
penalty.  
 
The three guidelines are implementing rules of the 2016 Interim Measures, each focuses on 
a particular issue. As well as these regulations that specific to online lending industry, P2P 
platforms are also subject to general legal rules, in particular Company Law, Contract Law, 
Anti-competition Law, Consumer Protection Law and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Law.    
 
The regulatory model created by the 2016 Interim Measures is sometimes described as a 
‘dual supervisory model‘. At central level, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CBIRC) acts as the lead regulator for P2P industry, responsible for developing 
rules for supervision and administration of the business activities of platforms as well as 
carry out regulation of business conduct. In the meanwhile, provincial governments are 
authorized to supervise P2P platforms within their respective jurisdictions, in particular 
regarding their recordation and registration. They also have the power to impose penalties 
on misbehaving platforms. Any particular platform is therefore subject to a dual supervision 
of the CBIRC and provincial government where it is registered.   
 
In addition, the National Internet Finance Association (NIFA) run by the central bank and 
with 400 members was also recruited to regulate China’s P2P sector. Article 34 of the 2016 
Interim Measures delegates the NIFA the power to establish rules of self-regulation and 
industry standards, to accept complaints and reporting, to conduct self-inspection, and so 
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on.  Given the limited resources of regulators and the challenging nature of the P2P 
industry, the NIFA is expected to play an important role under this new current regime.  
 
The regulation aims to eliminate fraudulent or poor business practices that plagued the 
industry and re-establish all platforms as information intermediaries. Under the current 
regulation, a P2P platform must separate its own funds from the funds of lenders and 
borrowers.7  The funds of lenders and borrowers must be in custody of a qualified 
commercial bank.8 As an information intermediary, a platform is now subject to an 
obligation to make truthful, adequate, complete and timely information disclosure to the 
public concerning the platform itself such as organization and operation.9 It is also obligated 
to disclose basic information regarding the borrowers to lenders ex ante, and to make 
continuous disclosure regarding borrowers’ financial status and factors that may affect their 
repayment capability. 10  A platform needs to submit an information disclosure 
announcement together with relevant documents periodically to the local government 
where it is registered and places them at its registry house for public inspection.11 In 
addition, the information submitted by a platform must be verified by a third party 
intermediaries like accounting firms, law firms.12  
 
Moreover, the regulation also provides that the balance of loans of the same natural person 
on one online lending platform cannot exceed RMB 200,000; for a legal person or any other 
organization, the upper limit is set as RMB 1 million.  There are further caps on the total 
balance of loans obtained by the same person from different online lending platforms: for a 
natural person, it is capped at RMB 1 million, for a legal person it is capped at RMB 5 
million.13 
 
                                                 
7 Article 28 of 2016 Interim Measures 
8 Above  
9 2017 Guideline on Information Disclosure, Article 2; Chapter 2 specifies the content of the required 
information.    
10 2017 Guideline , Article 9 
11 2016 Interim Measures, Article 31 
12 2016 Interim Measures, Article 31  
13 2016 Interim Measures, Article 17 
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The above requirements, though they can be costly, are definite and clear and therefore 
relatively easy for platforms (at least those large, well-operating ones) to meet. The 
protracted and changeable scheme of registration, by contrast, has been a serious challenge 
to the industry. Art 5 of the 2016 Interim Measure provides that all platforms must conduct 
recordation and registration with the local financial regulatory authority at the place where 
it is based. A platform that fails to go through the new procedure will be banned from 
continual operation. More detailed requirements are laid down by the 2016 Guideline on 
Online Lending Registration14 and the initial deadline for registration was set in June 2018. 
This was then delayed. On 13 August, the Task Force of Online Lending Rectification issued a 
‘Checklist for the Compliance of Online Lending Information Intermediaries’ (108 Checklist) 
which established a uniform standard for recordation and registration for all P2P platforms 
in China and set a new deadline in December 2018.  
 
This was followed by further delay and further change. 8 April 2019, media revealed the 
details of a new pilot registration programme (Yiling Caijing, 2019).15 According to the pilot 
programme, platforms will be categorized as national and regional platforms. In order to 
register as a national platform, a platform must have a minimum paid-up capital of 
RMB0.5bn; for a regional platform, the threshold is RMB50mn. The pilot registration 
programme will require national platforms to hold general risk reserves equal to 3 per cent 
of the lending made through their firm and set aside an amount equivalent to 6 per cent of 
each borrowing as a loan-loss provision for lenders. The ratios for regional platforms will be 
1 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively (Yiling Caijing, 2019).  Although this document has 
widespread online, it never officially published which casts further doubts on the prospect 
of registration.  
Consequences for the industry 
The heavily intensified focus on regulating the P2P industry and a general governmental 
crackdown on high-risk financing has caused the close down of many hundreds’ P2P 
platforms since 2015. It has already seen an immense drop in the number of Chinese P2P 
                                                 
14 Chapter 2  
15  The Pilot Programme for the Registration of Online Lending Information Intermediaries.  
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lending platforms by 50 % to 1,021 during 2018. At the end of November 2019, the number 
further shrunk to 369 (Wangdai Zhijia).  
Even the most prominent platforms have not escaped unscathed. These include the collapse 
of Tuandai and of Hongling Capital. The former firm had about 220,000 lenders and 
borrowers and a loan balance of RMB 14.5 billion, while the latter was one of the longest-
operating P2P platforms in China.  
Since 2017, the Chinese P2P market has been experiencing a dramatic shrinkage- Total 
monthly volume of China’s P2P lending has fallen from a peak of RMB253bn ($37.4bn) in 
June of 2017 to about RMB90bn ($13.1bn) in July of 2019; about RMB 667bn ($97.0bn) in 
loans are still outstanding in mid-2019, down from about RMB1,060bn ($151.7bn) in May 
2018 (Wangdai Zhijia). These are consistent with the annual figures shown in Table 1 and 
represent a fall in lending volumes to around one-third from their 2017 levels (though the 
volume of lending is still substantially greater than in either the US or the UK, the countries 
outside of China with the largest P2P lending volumes).  
The retrenchment of the market has severe consequences for investors, who in many cases 
have suffered life-altering losses (Bloomberg news, 2019). This has led to protests by 
ordinary people that have verged on mass unrest. Last year, two sporting stadiums in the 
city of Hangzhou, where many P2P companies are based, were converted into makeshift 
petition centers in order to handle the volume of complaints against online lenders 
(Bloomberg news, 2019)..  A number of business leaders in the P2P industry have fled China 
or vanished this year, while many others have been detained, prosecuted or convicted.   
4. International comparisons: regulation in the US and the UK 
This section compares the new Chinese regime for regulation of P2P lending with that 
obtaining in the US and in the UK. The key issue in both countries has been investor 
protection.16   The main point emerging from these international comparisons is that, in 
both jurisdictions, the protection of retail investors has required substantial and detailed 
                                                 
16 The other major issue is compliance with rules and regulations protecting consumer borrowers, a 
particularly complex issue in the US since these are set at state not federal level. See Chen, Kavuri and Milne 
(2020 forthcoming) for discussion.  
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disclosure requirements. It is made more than clear to investors that what they are 
investing in is not a bank deposit and involves much significant investment risks.  
 
As a consequence, the major platforms in both the US and the UK have come to rely on 
institutional investors to fund a substantial proportion of loans intermediated on their 
platforms. In the US some two-thirds of funding on both Prosper and LendingClub is from 
institutional investors. In the UK more than half of the funding of the two largest platforms, 
Zopa and Funding Circle is institutional.  
US 
From 2006 until 2008, US alternative lending developed with relatively little regulatory 
oversight other than that of existing banking and consumer lending regulation. 
Subsequently two major developments stand out.  
 In 2008 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)  ruled that the ‘notes’ (claims on 
payments of loan interest and principal) issued by platforms to investors were not 
exempt from securities laws and had to be registered with the SEC.  
 In 2015 the SEC issued detailed rules on how these securities laws were to be 
applied to alternative lending platforms.  
This regulatory approach, imposing strong protections on the sale of notes to retail 
investors, has been one of the main reasons why alternative lending in the US is now 
overwhelmingly an institutional investor not retail investor asset class. 
 
The initial years for US alternative lending platforms 2006-2008, in a deteriorating credit 
environment, were difficult for the nascent industry with high default rates raising obvious 
concerns about investor protection.17   A key development in investor protection regulation 
was in November 2008, when the SEC entered a cease-and-desist order against Prosper 
stating that it had been selling securities which must under US securities law be registered 
with the SEC (see Lo 2016a).18 In response, the legal compliance of platforms changed, with 
investors now required to hold non-recourse notes issued under a ‘shelf registration’ with 
                                                 
17 Lo (2016) reports from press coverage that ‘Even as the industry grew, lenders bore painfully high default 
rates―Prosper was charging off more than 20% of loans issued before 2008, while LendingClub fared better, 
but still had 8.5% of its pre-2008 loans in default.’ 
18 This and following paragraphs are again based substantially on (Manbeck and Franson, 2018). 
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the SEC (i.e. a single registration covering multiple note issues), each note representing 
claims on the payments of borrower interest and principal.  
 
This was a material difference to their business models. In order to sell these notes to a 
broad investor based, the platforms had to comply with the demanding requirements for 
registration and provision of investor information under the Truth in Securities Act and 
Securities Exchange Act (1933) as well as complying with all requirements for offering advice 
in securities investment and further requirements if they support a secondary market for 
resale of investments.19  The substantial burden of SEC registration, together with the 
accompanying obligation to comply with investment advice and the ‘blue sky’ securities 
laws of all states where investor notes were sold led to rapid industry consolidation. This 
consolidation left only two platforms surviving – those of Prosper and LendingClub.  
 
As both Prosper and LendingClub have demonstrated there is a substantial market for 
investment in platform loans amongst institutional investors. Sale of notes to institutional 
investors or other “accredited investors” does not require the compliance costs of shelf 
registration.20 
UK 
Similar issues of investor protection have emerged in the UK, with a reregulation of the 
industry now taking place with the aim of ensuring that retail investors are adequately 
informed about the risks of P2P lending. The UK saw some of the earliest developments in 
alternative lending platforms, with the 2005 establishment of Zopa offering peer-to-peer 
personal loans followed by the 2010 launch of Funding Circle offering small business loans. 
More than one hundred platforms have now been started in the UK and there has been 
                                                 
19 Manbeck and Franson (2018) highlight the compliance costs for marketplace platforms who offer notes i.e. 
for alternative lending platforms when compared with balance sheet lenders.: “The SEC registration process is 
complex, time-consuming and expensive. Operators who choose to register their Platform Notes for sale to the 
general public must be prepared to devote substantial resources to the effort.”   
20 As explained by Manbeck and Franson 2018, ‘the term “accredited investor” includes most institutional 
investors and individuals who (i) individually, or with their spouse, have a net worth exceeding $1 million 
exclusive of the value of the person’s primary residence (and subject to certain adjustments for “underwater” 
mortgages), or (ii) individually had an income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two preceding years, or had 
a joint income with spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years, and have a reasonable expectation of 
reaching the same income level in the current year.’ 
16 
rapid growth in total value of supported loans.21 Only a few platforms though operate on 
any scale, and at end-2017 only three intermediated more than £0.5 bn loans on their 
platforms: Funding Circle (small business loans £1.6bn), Zopa (personal loans £1.2bn) and 
Ratesetter (both personal and small business, £0.8bn).22  
 
Three phases can be distinguished. Initially alternative lending largely fell under the 
regulatory radar. It was subject only to general consumer credit regulation and the oversight 
of consumer lending by the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT).. A second phase was the 
introduction of a first  framework for regulation in 2014, with the transfer of regulatory 
responsibility from the OFT to the Financial Conduct Authority, and its subsequent 
development and implementation. This was given important political support by the 2010-
2015 coalition chancellor of the exchequer (finance minister) George Osborne. His March 
2014 budget introduced the Innovative Finance Individual Savings Accounts (IFISAs) for 
alternative lending platforms.23  The third  phase from 2016 to 2019  has been focused on 
strengthening of regulation especially protection of retail investors.  
 
The responsibility for regulation for alternative finance was transferred from the OFT to the 
FCA on 1st April 2014. The FCA introduced an initial framework for regulation of alternative 
finance covering both investment-based crowdfunding (equity crowdfunding) and loan-
based crowdfunding (alternative lending). 24  Loan-based crowdfunding was explicitly 
excluded from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) which insures bank 
deposits. New regulatory rules were introduced to protect investors and ensure continuity 
in the management of their investments should a platform fail.  
 
A focus of the new FCA regime was on systems and controls: applying its general 
requirements for regulated firms on adequacy of systems and controls and paying particular 
                                                 
21 http://www.p2pmoney.co.uk/companies.htm lists 133 platforms as of early Nov 2018, including 30 that had 
stopped doing P2P or were no longer in operation.  
22 http://p2pfa.info, Ratesetter data from https://invest.ratesetter.com/aboutus/statistics  
23 See (HM Revenues & Customs 2015). The objective of this policy is described as “To increase the choice and 
flexibility available to ISA investors, encourage the growth of peer to peer lending and improve competition in 
the banking sector by diversifying the available sources of finance.” 
24 See Financial Conduct Authority (2014). 
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attention to segregation of client assets (ensuring these are not comingled with platform 
assets); and arrangements for orderly transfer of business in the event of platform failure. 
P2P platforms (or what UK regulations terms ‘loan-based crowdfunding platforms’) are 
required to follow a scheme for segregation of client assets requirements (CASS or Client 
Asset Segregation Scheme) with applies to all regulated firms. Arrangements must also be in 
place to ensure that the servicing and administration of existing loans continue to be 
administered in the event of platform failure, with the transfer of loans to a third-party 
firm).  
 
A major concern of the FCA, over the following two years  was ensuring that retail investors 
were fully aware that loan participations through alternative lending platforms are not at all 
similar to bank deposits. They are not covered by the Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme (the UK bank deposit insurance scheme) and projected returns are not guaranteed 
with the possibility that investors could lose some of their initial investment. All the well-
established platforms make clear on their webpages and during the process of investment 
that they are risky investments. 
 
Between 2016 and 2018 the FCA consulted on the development of a new more detailed 
regulatory regime.25 The final rules were published in 2019.26 These include a set of detailed 
and strengthened rules covering the wind-down of platforms. Here every platform must 
have detailed policies in place in the form of a ‘resolution manual’ describing in practical 
detail how a wind-down will be implemented. This must: (i) describe arrangements that 
have been thoroughly assessed for their effectiveness, if necessary with external 
professional advice; (ii) give the regulators assurance that the contract terms agreed with 
investors and borrowers will be honoured even when the platform is no longer around to 
service them; and (iii)  platforms must give clear information about the impact of any wind-
down on both investors and borrowers. It will also contain much more explicit requirements 
on the systems and controls platforms need to have in place to support the claims they 
                                                 
25 See Financial Conduct Authority (2016a, 2106b, 2016c, 2018, 2019). 
26 These final rules are set out in Financial Conduct Authority (2019) 
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make to investors, for example about loan approvals and classifications and management of 
loan arrears. 
 
The new regime also introduces much stronger rules on governance, aiming to bring 
platforms in line with the FCA’s expectations of governance in investment management or 
in dealing, i.e. where properly fulfilling the fiduciary duties of an agent operating on behalf 
of a relatively uninformed client. They must have clearly stated risk management policies. 
Also, amongst their operational staffing responsibilities platforms must have independent 
risk-management, regulatory compliance and internal audit functions (for smaller platforms 
these functions can be combined with other responsibilities). Finally, they must 
demonstrate they are aware of and dealing appropriately with conflicts of interest, for 
example, opaque fee arrangements, participation in loans or loan markets by staff or family 
members or any other situation where decisions may potentially benefit a client or staff 
member at the expense of another client. 
5. The Future of China’s P2P Sector  
As described above, the China’s P2P sector has undergone a dramatic shake out and there is 
still no sign of halt. A reading of the newly designed regulations suggests that the initial plan 
of the government was certainly not to kill the whole industry, but to banish smaller 
platforms that are not mature or well-capitalized. (Note that JP Morgan highlights that the 
market share of the top 50 P2P companies in China has increased from about 35 per cent at 
the beginning of 2017 to 86 per cent at the end of last year. ) If the plan goes as anticipated, 
the market will eventually stabilize with 100 or so survivors (Wang and Bray, 2019).  
However, with the several changes of standard and repeated delay of deadlines since 2016, 
there is an increasing doubt in the industry in relation to the real intention of the central 
government. Recently, Hunan, Shandong, Chongqing and Henan provinces announced there 
is no single platform in their respective jurisdictions has passed the test for registration (that 
is to say, all existing P2P platforms in these jurisdictions must cease operating) (Hu, 2019).   
 
Even if the central government indeed likes to retain the P2P sector, there is an increasing 
concern that whether there will be any survivor at all after the great cleanup? As the crisis 
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unfolded, panic in the broader market led investors losing confidence and pulling their 
funds, this diminishing operators’ liquidity and caused more failures of platforms, which in 
turn further undermining investors’ confidence, a vicious cycle. As a result, even many 
prominent platforms have already closed down or are experiencing significant trouble. This 
pessimism reached its new peak in July 2019, when Lufax, the subsidiary of PingAn the 
Chinese Insurance giant and China’s largest platform with outstanding loans of RMB 98.4bn 
($14.3bn), announced its withdrawal from P2P lending. Some thought this might signal 
death of the industry (Leung, 2019).  
 
More lately, on 15 November 2019, the China’s Internet Financial Risk Special Rectification 
Work Leadership Team Office, which was launched by Beijing to mitigate risks in the online 
lending sector issued a notice of ‘Guidelines on Transforming Online-lending Information 
Intermediaries into Micro-loan Companies’ (No.83 Notice). In this notice, it stipulates the 
conditions and procedure of switching existing P2P platforms to micro-loan companies. In 
accordance with the notice, in order to turn into a regional micro-loan company, qualified 
P2P platforms need to meet a capital requirement of no less than 50 million yuan, and no 
less than 1 billion yuan to transition into a national micro lender. Fraudulent platforms and 
firms that contain serious credit risks would be banned from making the transition and 
forced to close. This transition needs to be completed within two years.  Whether No. 83 
Notice is an official announcement of the death of China’s P2P sector still remains to be 
seen, after all, it leaves for existing platforms themselves to choose whether or not to make 
such transition, not a mandatory requirement. It says nothing about those platforms that 
are not willing to switch to micro lenders or spells out the future of P2P sector.  
 
There might still be a hope for the P2P sector, although faint. This is based on two 
considerations. For one thing, a major difference from the UK and the US is that years of 
financial repression are still limiting the supply of credit from the Chinese banking industry.  
As documented in the IMF’s 2019 Article IV consultation (IMF 2019) bank lending in China 
continues to be dominated by loans to state owned enterprises which are actually 
increasing as a share of total loans. Loans to private enterprises are concentrated on larger 
businesses and there is a dearth of lending to SMEs. If the government believes that P2P 
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platforms can still play a useful role in easing SMEs’ financial constraints, it might retain the 
sector a living space.   
 
Another supportive factor is that the major Chinese technology firms are showing interest in 
P2P sector. Ant Financial Services, the parent of Alipay part owned by Alibaba the leading 
Chinese e-commerce, is viewed by investors as the most valuable global financial 
technology company in the world.  The opportunity to leverage value from its 1.3 billion 
users of AliPay has led it to be valued at $150 billion in 2018, 50% larger than the Goldman 
Sachs with a market value of $99 billion. Amongst several financial services activities that 
comprise Ant Financial Services is Zhao Cai Bao, launched in April 2014, a P2P lending facility 
embedded in Alipay that matches individual investors as lenders to individuals, micro 
businesses and SME borrowers.  Other P2P platforms may be supported by other major 
firms. The fourth largest internet tech company in China Jing Dong (after Alibaba, Tencent 




A further likely development is an increasing participation of institutional investors in P2P 
lending as the Chinese investment industry itself matures shifting with the large volume of 
funds now being built up in new wealth management funds (Ant Financial Services rapidly 





In this article, we reviewed the rise and fall of China’s P2P lending since 2007. In absence of 
regulation, Chinese SMEs’ financial constraints and residents’ demand for higher capital 
return led to a spectacular growth of P2P platforms, with the volume of lending increasing 
                                                 
27 This acquisition also illustrates the challenge of complying with the new registration requirements. Yilidai 
was latter was once considered as a candidate for registration by the local financial authority back to 2017, but 
seems to have preferred acquisition to obtaining the required investment capital from its previous owners 
(Sina, 2019). 
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sixty-fold over the course of only four years from 2013 to 2017. However, this growth has 
been largely based on a fundamentally flawed business model and many platforms later 
proved to be fraudulent. The government introduced since 2015 a comprehensive 
regulatory framework which has led to a substantial restructuring of the industry with the 
number of platforms already having fallen by 90 percent and expected to fall further; and 
the volume of new lending now less than one-third of its 2017 peak.  The Chinese 
government’s ultimate intention to P2P sector is still not entirely clear, although it has 
apparently lost enthusiasm for P2P lending. If the P2P sector can indeed survive, we expect 
it will become fairly concentrated with a small number of large players and dominated by 
institutional investors, subject to rigorous regulation. That is to say, it will look very similar 
to its US and UK counterparts in many aspects.  
 
The rise and fall of China’s P2P sector offered an important lesson for financial innovation in 
emerging markets.  The economic growth in these markets is often constrained by financial 
accessibility and weak financial regulation.  Financial innovation (including but not limited to 
P2P lending) utilizing automated processes to reduce costs and requiring no collateral by 
relying on non-traditional data, is considered by some as a useful means to circumvent  the  
weakness of financial regulation and challenges of enforcement. The experience of China’s 
P2P sector, just like that of Thailand and other South East Asian countries in the 
1990s,  indicates that the opposite is true. Financial innovation pose particular danger of 
waste of economic resources when financial regulation is weak.  
 
We therefore conclude that financial authorities in low-income and emerging market 
countries need to be especially careful about promoting and encouraging innovative fintech 
activities.  One the one hand regulation should not be so rigid as to prohibit innovation 
entirely. On the other, when innovation does take place, the authorities must be especially 
vigilant in ensuring that these innovations do not threaten prudential safety and soundness 
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